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Abstract 
We offer an explanation for the inconclusive results of empirical studies into the 
relationship between the magnitude of the Gini coefficient of income distribution at 
origin and the intensity of migration. Bearing in mind the substantial literature that 
identifies relative deprivation as an important determinant of migration behavior, we 
study the relationship between aggregate or total relative deprivation, TRD, the Gini 
coefficient, G, and migration. We show that for a given change of incomes, TRD and G 
can behave differently. We present examples where, in the case of universal increases in 
incomes, TRD increases while G does not change; G decreases while TRD does not 
change; and G decreases while TRD increases. We generalize these examples into formal 
criteria, providing sufficient conditions on the initial and final income vectors under 
which incongruence between the directions of changes of G and of TRD occur. Our 
analysis leads us to infer that when the incentive to migrate increases with TRD, then this 
response can co-exist with no change of G or with a decrease of G.   
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1. Introduction 
The intense interest in the causes and consequences of income inequality did not miss the 
intriguing topic of how measures or dimensions of income inequality contribute to the incidence 
of migration. Comprehensive evidence for the positive relationship between income inequality at 
origin and the intensity of migration assembled by Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004), led Stark 
(2006) to outline an analytical-behavioral foundation for the relationship. Stark showed that when 
the aggregate income of a population is held constant, income inequality within the population, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, is in functional terms positively related to Total Relative 
Deprivation, TRD, in the population, and he inferred that the positive relationship between 
income inequality at origin and migration documented by Liebig and Sousa-Poza can easily be 
confused with the true relationship, which is between TRD at origin and migration. 
 It is worth mentioning that considerable empirical evidence finds that relative deprivation 
is a statistically significant explanatory variable of migration behavior. Stark and Taylor (1991) 
show that relative deprivation increases the probability that household members will migrate 
from rural Mexico to the US. More recently, Quinn (2006) reports that relative deprivation is a 
significant motivating factor in domestic migration decisions in Mexico. Czaika (2012) finds that 
in India relative deprivation is an important factor in deciding whether a household member 
should migrate, especially over a short distance. Basarir (2012) observes that people in Indonesia 
are willing to bear a loss of absolute wealth if there is a relative wealth gain from migration. 
Jagger et al. (2012) report that relative deprivation is a significant explanatory variable of circular 
migration in Uganda. Vernazza (2013) concludes that, even though interstate migration in the US 
confers substantial increases in absolute income, the trigger for migration is relative deprivation 
(low relative income), not low absolute income. Drawing on data from the 2000 US census, 
Flippen (2013) shows that both black and white people who migrate from the North to the South 
generally have average lower absolute incomes than their stationary northern peers, yet enjoy 
significantly lower relative deprivation, and that the relative deprivation gains for black people 
are substantially larger than those for white people. Hyll and Schneider (2014) use a data set 
collected in the German Democratic Republic in 1990 to show that aversion to relative 
deprivation enhanced the propensity to migrate to western Germany. Kafle et al. (2018) use 
comparable longitudinal data from integrated household and agriculture surveys from Tanzania, 
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Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda, and find that wealth relative deprivation is positively 
associated with migration. 
More recent studies than the inquiry by Liebig and Sousa-Poza do not yield an 
unequivocal verdict regarding the sign of the relationship between income inequality at origin, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, and migration. Using 2005 Eurobarometer data for 25 EU 
countries, Fouarge and Ester (2007) find that income inequality at origin has a positive effect on 
the intention to migrate among individuals with average education, whereas no such effect is 
observed among less educated and highly educated individuals. Using the same 2005 
Eurobarometer data for a smaller sample of the ten newly admitted countries of the 2004 EU 
enlargement, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) find that the impact of income inequality at origin 
on the intention to migrate is positive and highly significant. Stark et al. (2009) find that regional 
income inequality in Poland had a positive impact on international migration from Poland and on 
interregional migration within Poland between 1999 and 2005. Drawing on annual data from 
several sources for 1975-2005, Agbola and Acupan (2010) do not find conclusive evidence that 
income inequality in the Philippines affects the migration decisions of its population. Based on 
averaged data from 1990s for a large set of developed and developing countries, Czaika (2013) 
argues that income inequality at origin is, if at all, negatively correlated with total migration rates. 
Mihi-Ramirez et al. (2017) find a positive effect of income inequality at origin on net migration 
among the rich countries of the EU 28, but no effect whatsoever among the poor countries of the 
EU 28. The overall impression that emerges from these results appears to be that the sign of the 
relationship between income inequality at origin, as measured by the Gini coefficient, and 
migration behavior can be any.  
In view of this incongruence, we argue that whereas TRD measures a real inequality-
based incentive for migration, the Gini coefficient does not. The potential influence of the Gini 
coefficient on migration behavior arises from its relationship with TRD. To delineate the 
distinction between TRD and the Gini coefficient as measures of inequality, we take a step 
beyond the analysis of Stark (2006), relaxing the assumption of a constant total income at origin. 
To obtain sharp results, we allow all incomes at origin to increase and then, depending on the 
precise characterization of the increase in incomes, we draw a distinction between the effect of 
this increase on the Gini coefficient and on TRD. What we find is that a proportional increase in 
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all incomes will have no effect on the Gini coefficient while it increases TRD; that a uniform 
increase in all incomes will reduce the Gini coefficient while it has no effect on TRD; and that a 
mixed (partly proportional, partly uniform) increase in all incomes will reduce the Gini 
coefficient while it increases TRD. Consequently, if the incentive to migrate increases when TRD 
at origin rises, holding constant all the relevant characteristics of the migration destination, then 
the increase of the inclination to migrate can co-exist not only with an increase of the Gini 
coefficient at origin but also with no change of the Gini coefficient at origin or with a decrease of 
the Gini coefficient at origin.  
In Section 2 we sketch briefly the relationship between the Gini coefficient and TRD. This 
formulation serves as a background to the assessment in Section 3 of the possible repercussions 
of an increase in total income for the Gini coefficient, and for TRD. Section 4 summarizes and 
concludes. 
2. The relationship between the Gini coefficient and Total Relative Deprivation 
Let n nV   be a set of ordered vectors, namely 
 
1 2 1 2{( , , , ) : }
n n
n nx x x x xV x     .  
By TI (“Total Income”) we delineate the aggregate or total income of a given population, namely 
for any 1 2( , , , )
n
nx x x Vx   : 
 
1 2( ) .nTI x x x x     
Let the RD (“Relative Deprivation”) of individual i, 1,2,..., 1i n  , whose income is 
ix  be  
 
1
1
( ) ( )
n
i j i
j i
RD x x x
n  
  ,  
and for individual n let ( ) 0nRD x  .
1 By TRD we delineate the sum of the levels of relative 
deprivation of the members of a population, namely for any 1 2( , , , )
n
nx x x Vx   : 
                                                          
1 This formula for RD can be taken, for example, from Stark (2006). 
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1 1
( )
( )
n n
j i
i j i
x
TRD x
x
n
  



.   
For any 
1 2( , , , )
n
nx x x Vx   , the Gini coefficient of income distribution of a population, 
( )G x , is 2  
 
1
1 1
( )
(
( )
( )
)
n n
j i
n
i
i j i
i
x
G x
TI
x
x
n x
x
TRD

  





. 
As can be seen at once, for a given ( )TI x , ( )G x  and ( )TRD x  are positively related. It is on this 
basis that Stark (2006) sought to explain the positive relationship between the Gini coefficient at 
origin and the intensity of migration. Conjecturing that the incentive to migrate in a population is 
positively related to TRD in the population, and establishing that the Gini coefficient and TRD go 
hand in hand when TI is held constant, Stark argued that the Gini coefficient and migration are 
positively related. 
3. Changing total income: Repercussions for the Gini coefficient and for Total Relative 
Deprivation 
Relaxing the assumption of a constant TI enables us to extend the analysis of Stark (2006) by 
studying the consequences of varying TI for the nature of the relationship between the Gini 
coefficient, G, and TRD. For illustrative purposes, we first consider three examples referring, for 
                                                          
2 According to Sen (1977), the Gini coefficient for 
n
x  can be expressed as 
1 1
1
|
2
|
( )
n n
i
n
j
i j
i
i
x x
n x
G x
 





. For 
n
x V  
this formula can be rewritten as 
1 1
1
)
) .
(
(
n n
j i
i
n
i
j i
i
x
n x
G
xx
 






 Taking into account that 
1
( )
n
i
i
xTI x

 , and that 
1 1
( )
( )
n n
j i
i j i
x
TRD x
x
n
  



, we get that 
(
(
) .
)
)
(
TRD x
TI
G
x
x   
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simplicity’s sake, to the case of two individuals. In the examples, incomes increase, so we can 
consider the constellation of income gains as a growth experience. However, across the examples 
the increase of incomes is distributed differently. 
Scenario 1. 
Incomes increase, G remains unchanged, yet TRD increases. For example:  
(1, 3) → (2, 6).  
Here incomes increase; G remains the same at 1/4; and TRD increases from 1 to 2. 
Scenario 2. 
Incomes increase, G decreases, yet TRD remains the same. For example: 
(1, 3) → (2, 4). 
Here incomes increase; G declines from 1/4 to 1/6; and TRD is the same at 1. 
Scenario 3. 
Incomes increase, G decreases, yet TRD increases. For example:  
(1, 3) → (2, 5). 
Here incomes increase; G decreases from 1/4 to 3/14; and TRD increases from 1 to 3/2.3   
These three scenarios suggest that an increase in all incomes at origin may affect G but 
not TRD; it may affect TRD but not G; or it may affect both G and TRD such that they move in 
opposite directions. These results might appear puzzling because both G and TRD measure 
income inequality. The reason behind this conundrum is that whereas TRD is “locally linear” 
with respect to the ordered incomes, the Gini coefficient is not linear. Therefore, these two 
indices do not measure the same type of inequality. We may say that whereas TRD measures the 
“absolute inequality” in a population, the Gini coefficient measures the “relative inequality” with 
                                                          
3 When considered “in reverse,” namely when incomes decrease rather than increase, the three scenarios yield three 
additional possibilities for the relationship between TRD and G. For example, a reversed third scenario, namely (2, 5) 
→ (1, 3), shows that it is possible that at the same time TRD decreases and G increases. We do not consider these 
possibilities as separate scenarios because they are the “dual” of the presented scenarios. 
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respect to the aggregate income of the population. Thus, it is not surprising that the two indices 
“behave” differently.  
In the form of a claim, we next provide a generalization of Scenarios 1, 2, and 3.  
Claim 1. 
Let , nx y V . Consider a population with an ordered vector of incomes x  that changes to an 
ordered vector of incomes y . We have that: 
(a) A constant rate of income growth for every individual, namely the same proportional income 
growth for every individual.  
If there exists 1,a a   such that y ax , then  
 ( ) ( );  ( ) ( );  ( ) ( ).TRD y TRD x TI y TI x G y G x    
(b) Every individual receives the same lump sum income transfer. 
If there exists b   such that ( , , , )y x b b b  , then 
 ( ) ( );  ( ) ( );  ( ) ( ).TRD y TRD x TI y TI x G y G x    
(c) Every individual receives a mix of a proportional income growth and a lump sum income 
transfer. 
If there exists ,, 1a b a   such that ( , , , )y b bax b   , then 
 ( ) ( );  ( ) ( );  ( ) ( ).TRD y TRD x TI y TI x G y G x    
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Naturally, Claim 1 (a) is a generalization of Scenario 1 (where 2a  ), Claim 1 (b) is a 
generalization of Scenario 2 (where 1b  ), and Claim 1 (c) is a generalization of Scenario 3 
(where 3 / 2a   and 1/ 2b  ) . 
A sufficient condition for an increase in incomes of all the individuals to co-exist with an 
increase of total relative deprivation and a decrease of the Gini coefficient is provided in the next 
claim. 
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Claim 2. 
Let , nx y V . Consider a population with a vector of incomes x  that changes to a vector of 
incomes y . If ny Vx   and ( ) ( )G y x G x  , then ( ) ( );  TI y TI x ( ) ( );TRD y TRD x  and 
( ) ( )G y G x .  
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Claim 2 informs us that if y x  is an ordered vector such that 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2( , , , ) :
n
n n n ny x y x y x y x y x y x          , and if the Gini coefficient 
calculated for that vector is smaller than the Gini coefficient calculated for the vector x (namely 
when the increase in incomes from x to y is bigger for richer individuals in absolute terms, but 
bigger for poorer individuals in relative terms), then an increase in the incomes of a population 
from x to y results in an increase in TRD of the population, and in a reduction of the Gini 
coefficient in the population. In other words, when the additional income is distributed among the 
individuals in such a way that the richer individuals obtain a larger part of the extra income in 
absolute terms (as per assumption ny Vx  ), but a smaller part in relative terms, namely the 
additional income is divided more equally than the initial income (as per assumption 
( ) ( )G y x G x  ), then the Gini coefficient decreases, while TRD increases. 
When we look into the construction of G and TRD, we notice that TRD is the aggregate of 
the levels of relative deprivation, RD, of members 1,2,..., 1i n   of the population. The RD of 
individual i is lowered when the income of an individual positioned to the right of individual i in 
the income distribution is reduced, but is not affected when the income of an individual who is 
positioned to the left of individual i in the income distribution is reduced. However, G is sensitive 
to both these changes (it will be reduced in the first case, it will be increased in the second case). 
It is this asymmetry between the two indices that gives rise to a divergence between their 
predictions. 
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4. Summary and conclusion 
This paper underscores that when the incentive to migrate is studied, a distinction needs to be 
drawn between two measures of income inequality: the Gini coefficient and total relative 
deprivation, TRD. Intuitively, when the income vector of a population changes, the Gini 
coefficient and TRD could be expected to indicate the same qualitative change in inequality: if 
one of them increases (or decreases), then the other should similarly change. We showed that 
such an intuition can be misleading. We constructed numerical examples and we formulated 
sufficient conditions under which the Gini coefficient and TRD “behave” differently: with 
varying distributions of the increase in total income at origin, we generated divergence between 
changes of the Gini coefficient and TRD. Extending a preceding reasoning by Stark (2006), we 
relaxed Stark’s assumption of a constant total income, and we showed that the Gini coefficient 
and TRD need not be positively correlated. 
The current paper stays in line with Stark’s (2006) argument that TRD, instead of the Gini 
coefficient, is the true driver of migration behavior. Empirical observations listing the Gini 
coefficient at origin among the determinants of migration behavior can stem from a functional 
link between the Gini coefficient and TRD: the TRD of a population is a product of the Gini 
coefficient of the population and total income of the population. This link, already determined by 
Stark (2006), delivers an explanation for the divergence of results of empirical studies regarding 
the sign of the relationship between the Gini coefficient of income distribution at origin and the 
intensity of migration. According to Eurostat (2018) data for EU countries, the sign of the 
relationship between the Gini coefficient and TRD (calculated as a product of the Gini 
coefficient, the mean disposable income in a population, and the size of the working-age 
population) differs depending on the country. While in some countries the correlation between 
the Gini coefficient and TRD between 2007 and 2017 is positive and strong (0.95 in Sweden and 
0.92 in Denmark), in other countries it is positive and weak (0.16 in Latvia), negative and weak 
( 0.18  in Romania), or even negative and strong ( 0.89  in Poland). Thus, we maintain that the 
preceding framework in Stark (2006) is delicate, and can be applied to match a new set of 
empirical findings. The framework presented in the current paper is richer than Stark’s (2006), 
and will be useful in future studies on inequality and migration. 
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That an increase in all incomes will coincide with an increase in TRD or with an increase 
of the Gini coefficient may not be all that surprising. However, our analysis gives rise to a 
possibility that the incentive to migrate increases because TRD at origin increases, in spite of all 
incomes at origin increasing, and the Gini coefficient at origin decreasing. Such a possibility was 
not acknowledged before. The examples (scenarios) and claims presented in this paper serve to 
elucidate a need to exercise caution when basing a prediction of migration behavior on standard 
“push” indicators.  
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Appendix: Proofs of Claims 1 and 2 
To facilitate proof of the claims, we first state and prove a supportive lemma.  
Lemma 1.  
TI and TRD are “linear” on nV , namely for any a   and any ,
nx y V  
(i) ( ) ( ) ( );  ( ) ( ) ( )TI x y TI x TI y TRD x y TRD x TRD y      ; 
(ii) ) ( );  ( ) ( ).(ax aTI x TRD ax aTI RDT x    
Moreover, if , )( , ,x b b b , b   then 
(iii) ( ) 0;  ( ) 0.TI x TRD x    
Proof.  
Properties (i), (ii), and (iii) are immediate consequences of the formulae of TI and TRD (it 
suffices to substitute the formulas for TI and TRD (presented in Section 2) into (i), (ii), and (iii)). 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 1. 
(a) By Lemma 1, part (ii) 
( ) ) ( )( ( );ax aTRD y T TR x xD D TRDR    
) ( ) () )( ;(ax aTI y TI TI x TI x   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ).
( ) ( ) ( ) (
)
)
(
TRD y TRD ax aTRD x TRD x
G x
TI y TI ax aTI x TI x
G y      
(b) By Lemma 1, parts (i) and (iii) 
( ) ( , )) ( ) , )( , (( , , ), ;b TRTRD y TRD x b D x TRD b Tb b b RD x       
( ) ( ( , , , )) ( ) , ) ( );( , ,TI y TI x b b TIb x bTI b b TI x       
( ) ( ) ( )
( ).
( ) ( ) ,
( )
( , ) (, )
TRD y TRD x TRD x
G x
TI y TI x TI b TI x
G y
b b
 
 
   
11 
 
(c) By Lemma 1 
( ) ( ( , , ( ,, )) ( ) , ) ( ) (, ) ( );ax b TRD ax TRD b TRD ax aTTRD y TRD b b RDb x xb TRD         
( ) ( ( , , ( , , ( , ,, )) ( ) , ) ( ) , ) ( );TI y TI b b bax b TI ax TI b aTI x TI b Tb b b I x          
( ) , )) ( )
( ) , )) ( ) , )
( ) ( )
( ).
( ) ( )
( ( , ,
( )
( ( , , ( , ,
TRD y ax b aTRD x
TI y ax b aTI x TI b
aTRD x TRD x
G x
aTI x
TRD b b
G y
TI b b b b
TI x
 
 
  
  


 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 2. 
By Lemma 1, part (i) 
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ).x y x TITI y TI x TI y x TI x       
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ).TRD y TRD x y x TRD x TRD y x TRD x        
From the assumption that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
TRD y x TRD x
G y x G x
TI y x TI x

   

, it follows that 
( ) ( )
( ) .
( )
TRD x TI y x
TRD y x
TI x

   
Thus, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )[ ( ) ( )] ( )
( ).
( )[ ( ) ( )]
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
TRD y
TI y TI x TI y x
TRD x TI y x
TI x
TI
TRD x TRD y x
x TI y x
TRD x TI x TI y x TRD x
G x
TI x TI x TI y x TI x
G y
TRD x

 


 
 
 


 



 
Q.E.D. 
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